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Right of First Refusal and Waiver of
the Right of Judicial Partition
By JOHN M. RuBENS*
THE usual condominium plan contains extensive management pro-
visions within the Declaration of Covenants to create a centralized
administration of the project. The tenant owners agree that a managing
authority shall exclusively maintain common areas, provide common
services and enter into contracts relating to the efficient operation of
the building and its facilities.
Contract Liability
The managing authority is either an individual or individuals, an
unincorported association or a corporation. In either case, the con-
tracts made for the benefit of the individual unit owners are contracts
made by an agent for its principal.' It can be argued that such contracts,
because they benefit all tenant owners, bind them jointly and severally.'
However, if not joint and several, the tenant owners' liability would
clearly be joint,3 and in California the creditor may elect to proceed
against any single tenant owner.4 Although the tenant owner who extin-
guishes the joint obligation may pursue his right of contribution from
the co-owners,5 the exercise of the right may well be more costly in litiga-
tion fees and court costs than the amount of the tenant-creditor's claim.
Tort Liability
Aside from the potential contract liabilities of the tenant owners,
each of them must seriously consider his potential tort liability for
* B.S. 1958, University of California; LL.B. 1961, Hastings College of the Law; Member,
San Francisco, California and American Bar Associations.
1 In the case of a corporation, the tenant owners would be liable as undisclosed or
partially disclosed principals. See Shamlian v. Wells, 197 Cal. 716, 242 Pac. 483 (1925).
Or they may be individually liable because they are the alter ego of a corporation whose
corporate form will be disregarded by the court. See Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal. 2d 576,
364 P.2d 473 (1961) ; Automotriz Del Golfo v. Resnick, 47 Cal. 2d 792, 306 P.2d 1 (1957) ;
BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 122, at 292-93 (rev. ed. 1946) ; LATTiN, CORPORATIONS 66 (1959).
See CAL. Civ. CODE § 1659; but see CAL. Civ. CoDE § 1431.
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.
'See CA . CODE Crv. PRoc. § 414.
See CAL. Crv. CODE § 1432.
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injuries to third persons caused by unsafe conditions in the common
areas or by the acts of common servants. This tort liability would be
joint and several, whether it be imputed because of ownership6 or
respondeat superior.'
The importance of the area of tort liability is accentuated by the
fact that there is no right of contribution among joint tortfeasors until
a money judgment is rendered against all of those from whom contribu-
tion is sought.' Therefore, a real practical problem exists because not
only may the injured plaintiff fail to join all tenant owners in his law-
suit, but also some of the tenant owners may be judgment proof. Insur-
ance may or may not solve the problem depending upon whether or not
the injured party's claim exceeds the policy limits. A "hold-harmless"
agreement may be helpful to give the tenant owner a right of indemnity
from his neighbors and therefore protect the tenant owner to some extent,
but the financial responsibility of the co-owners will determine its prac-
tical effectiveness.
Harmonious Environment
Aside from purely economic factors there are the environmental fac-
tors involved when several owners live in close proximity to one another
and share the common services and facilities of the condominium proj-
ect. Effective rules and safeguards must be provided in order to prevent
any disturbance to an environment that is conducive to a successful
project.
The joint tort and contractual liability, as well as the necessity for
a harmonious environment, requires some sort of provision in the decla-
ration of covenants to control who may become a tenant owner. What
type of provision is necessary? It would be desirable to provide that
consent of the co-owners be obtained before a tenant owner could trans-
fer his interest. However, the rule against restraints on alienation must
be considered by the drafter of the Declarations if he intends to control
successive ownership.
Right of First Refusal
Rule Against Restraint Upon Alienation
The rule against the hindrance of free alienability of land is not
involved when the condominium interest is a life estate9 or an estate for
6 Farrell v. Placer County, 23 Cal. 2d 624, 145 P.2d 570 (1944).
' Hiner v. Olson, 23 Cal. App. 2d 227, 72 P.2d 890 (1937).
'See CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 875(a).
'See RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §§ 409, 410 (1944).
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years." The reason behind this is twofold: the grantor or lessor, the
holder of the reversion, has an interest in protecting the property from
an undesirable tenant, and also there is no undue interference with the
alienability of property.
In a stock cooperative, the right to sell stock is usually subject to a
consent requirement. Such restrictions are generally upheld on the
theory that a closely held commercial corporation may protect itself
against hostile and disinterested persons becoming a part of the manage-
ment. " Although the interest in the condominium is an interest in real
property rather than a shareholder interest, the condominium is in sub-
stance no different from the stock cooperative in this regard. The
necessity for socially compatible and financially responsible persons is
present in both. However, since there is no indication, absent legislation,
that the transfer of the condominium interest will be treated differently
by our courts from the transfer of other fee interests in real property,
the rule must be considered by the draftsman.
Generally there are three types of restraints :12 (a) disabling
restraints, (b) forfeiture restraints, and (c) promissory restraints. The
first type of restraint is one which is an absolute prohibition against
alienation; i.e., "the grantee shall not transfer", or "any transfer shall
be void." The second type of restraint on alienation is phrased in terms
of a fee simple determinable or a fee simple subject to a condition sub-
sequent. The third type is a covenant not to alienate which attempts to
make the grantee liable for damages if he does transfer.
Under the general law, and by the express terms of the California
Civil Code,' all three types of restraints, with certain exceptions, are
illegal and void. 4 A restraint requiring the consent of the grantor to
approve every prospective transferee would clearly be void. 5 One
exception to the rule against restraints on alienation is the right of first
refusal. A provision in the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and
Restrictions that the grantee will not sell the estate without first offering
See Burns v. McGraw, 75 Cal. App. 2d 481, 171 P.2d 148 (1946).
l' CAL. CORP. CODE § 501(g), 2403(c), 9609; see Casady v. Modern Metal Spinning
& Mfg. Co., 188 Cal. App. 2d 728, 10 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1961) (first refusal to corporation
and other shareholders); Vannucci v. Pedrini, 217 Cal. 138, 17 P.2d 706 (1932) (first
refusal right to corporation and other shareholders valid).
, See RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 404 et seq. (1944).
"s CAL. CIV. CODE § 711: "A condition restraining alienation, if repugnant to the interest
created, is void."
" See Bonnell v. McLaughlin, 173 Cal. 213, 159 Pac. 590 (1916) ; Wharton v. Mollinet,
103 Cal. App. 2d 710, 229 P.2d 861 (1951). These cases should be distinguished from
restraints as to use. See Los Angeles v. Gary, 181 Cal. 680, 186 Pac. 596 (1919) ; Cornbleth
v. Allen, 80 Cal. App. 459, 251 Pac. 87 (1926).
"5 See Maynard v. Polhemus, 74 Cal. 141, 15 Pac. 451 (1887); Murray v. Green,
64 CaL 363, 28 Pac. 118 (1883).
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it to the grantor, or some other designated person, would appear to be
valid and not a restraint against alienation.' 6
However, it should be noted that the appellate court, in the case of
Bay Shore Motors v. Baker,'" relied upon section 715 of the California
Civil Code to uphold the option therein.'" Since Civil Code section 715
has been repealed by the legislature, 9 the courts could hold that there
is no limitation to Civil Code section 711, and the preemption option,
or right of first refusal, would be void. However, there is no real basis
for such a holding as long as the right of first refusal is not unreasonable
nor, in effect, an indirect preclusion of the right to alienate. The right
of first refusal should be held valid if reasonable, for if reasonable it
will not inhibit alienation nor be "repugnant to the interest created."
A provision in the condominium Declaration that the grantee shall not
sell unless the grantor (or managing authority) shall fail to purchase
at the offer price of a prospective purchaser and after thirty days' notice
so to do, does not deprive the tenant owner of his right to transfer the
interest. The unit interest and the undivided interest in the common areas
can be sold at no loss of the fair price to the tenant owner. The option
is not unreasonable in that it is not an option to purchase exercisable at
the will of a holder and, further, it does not restrict the class of persons
to whom the tenant owner may sell. When the option is exercised it must
be exercised at the price and on the terms that a third party has offered
and not at a stipulated price nor upon fixed terms.2" Thus, the owner
may decide to sell whenever he wants, and he can do so at the prevailing
market price. Although the right of first refusal is usually discussed
in the terms stated above, its possible scope should be considered.
If the right of first refusal were to include a separate clause giving
the grantor an absolute option to purchase from the personal representa-
tive of the tenant owner, such a clause would clearly restrain alienation
by devise. Similarly, if the option clause attempted to prevent a gift
by the grantor. However, a standard successor-in-interest clause could
1" See Bay Shore Motors v. Baker, 90 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 895, 202 P.2d 865 (1949);
RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 413 (1944).
27 Ibid.
1 Id. at 896. "In the absence of section 715 of the Civil Code, there might be a basis
for this contention of defendant but when section 711 is read with section 715 it becomes
at once apparent that section 711 contains no inhibition on time limit restraints on alienation
if otherwise lawful, for such time limit restraints on alienation are specifically declared
to be valid if they are within the limits prescribed by section 715. . ....
19 CAL. CIv. CODE § 715, repealed by CAL. STATS. 1951, C. 1463, p. 3443 § 7; CAL. Crv.
CODE § 715.1, repealed by CAL. STATS. 1959, c. 470, p. 2405 § 1.
"I Maynard v. Polhemus, 74 Cal. 141, 15 Pac. 451 (1887) (if B "shall ever sell any
of the aforesaid property, it shall be sold to (A) at the aforesaid (fixed) price").
(Vol. 14
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be used to bind the donee, devisee or personal representative if he should
later attempt to sell to a bona fide purchaser.21
Although the right of first refusal would seem to be valid as not
being in violation of the rule against restraints on alienation, it is sub-
ject to the Rule Against Perpetuities. 2
Rule Against Perpetuities
The right of first refusal gives the holder an election to acquire a
property interest at a future. time. Therefore, the contingent interest
must vest, if at all, within the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities.
If there is a possibility that it may vest at any time beyond the period,
the option will be void.2"
A properly drafted declaration would not create any problem. The
beginning of the period, under this rule, would be the time when the
interest is created; i.e., the delivery of the deed which is the subject of
the restrictions. The measuring life would be the life of the grantee, the
tenant owner. Thus, the interest is bound to vest, by exercise of the
option, during the life of the tenant owner when he decides to sell his
interest. In the event that the tenant owner dies after the exercise of the
option but before the deed is transferred to the optionor, the obligation
is binding on the owner's personal representative and can be enforced
by the optionee.2"
The option to repurchase has been held to be subject to the Rule
Against Perpetuities in a number of cases.25 The options to repurchase
which have been held to violate the rule were not truly rights of first
refusal. They actually gave the optionee the absolute right to repurchase
" See note 27 infra with respect to the Rule Against Perpetuities.
" CAL. CIV. CODE § 715.2: "No interest in real or personal property shall be good unless
it must vest if at all, not later than 21 years after some life in being at the creation of
the interest and any period of gestation involved in the situation to which the limitation
applies. The lives selected to govern the time of vesting must not be so numerous or so
situated that evidence of their deaths is likely to be unreasonably difficult to obtain.
It is intended by the enactment of this section to make effective in this State the American
common-law rule against perpetuities." See Alamo School Dist. v. Jones, 182 Cal. App. 2d
180, 6 Cal. Rptr. 272 (1960).
23 Haggerty v. City of Oakland, 161 Cal. App. 2d 407, 326 P.2d 957 (1958) ; Dallapi v.
Campbell, 45 Cal. App. 2d 541, 114 P.2d 646 (1941).
"Thomson v. Lineer, 86 Cal. App. 2d 838, 195 P.2d 838 (1948).
Los Angeles Inv. Co. v. Gary, 181 Cal. 680, 186 Pac. 596 (1919) (covenant that
grantee shall not sell, lease or rent to non-caucasian, breach of which caused property to
revert to grantor); Bonnell v. McLaughlin, 173 Ca]. 213, 159 Pac. 590 (1916) (condition
that grantee not sell, mortgage, convey or alienate without grantor's consent); Prey v.
Stanley, 110 Cal. 423, 42 Pac. 908 (1895) (covenant that owner of property shall not sell
without consent, breach of which resulted in forfeiture); Murray v. Green, 64 Cal. 363,
28 Pac. 118 (1883) (condition that grantee not sell without written consent of grantor).
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without any limitations as to time 26 or price." The solution would be
either to provide a saving clause in the declaration stating that the option
will in no event last beyond certain lives in being plus 21 years, or
simply to provide that the optionor shall not during his lifetime sell,
assign or transfer his ownership without first giving the optionee a right
of first refusal for a specified time at the bona fide offer price of the
desiring third party purchaser.2"
What if the tenant owner is a corporation or partnership? A practical
problem with respect to the rule exists when the tenant owner is such
an entity. In the instance of a corporation, whose is the measuring life?
Since a corporation's life is perpetual, is the option void or valid? The
right of first refusal would appear to be void as in violation of the rule
unless a time limit of 21 years were placed thereon, for it has been held
that a corporation cannot constitute a life in being within the rule.29
In the instance of a partnership the problem is not as great. However,
the number of partners and their location may make evidence of the
death unreasonably difficult to obtain. ° This problem is accentuated
under the Corporation Code wherein it is permissible by agreement to
continue the partnership beyond the death of a partner."'
Remedy of the Grantors
Since California would not allow a destruction of title for failure
to comply with the right of first refusal, the holder of the option would
be relegated to an action for an injunction, or after sale, damages.32
However, the burden of proof with respect to damages would be ex-
tremely hard for the optionee to meet. A liquidated damages clause
would to some extent relieve this burden and also tend to insure com-
pliance by the tenant owner, but such a clause may be held to be void.33
26 Alamo School Dist. v. Jones, 182 Cal. App. 2d 180, 6 Cal. Rptr. 272 (1960).
27 Maynard v. Polhemus, 74 Cal. 141, 15 Pac. 415 (1887).
.' If a successor in interest clause is used to bind the donee, devisee or personal repre-
sentative of the tenant owner, a saving clause should be used to prevent a violation of the
Rule Against Perpetuities.
2" See Fitchie v. Brown, Hawaii, 211 U.S. 321 (1908).
20 CAL. CIv. CODE § 715.2.
1 CAL. CoRP. CODE § 15031.
12 CAL. CIv. CODE § 3300: "For breach of an obligation arising from contract, the measure
of damages, except where otherwise expressly provided by this Code, is the amount which
will compensate the party aggrieved for all the detriment proximately caused thereby, or
which, in the ordinary course of things, would be likely to result therefrom."
"2 CAL. CIv. CODE § 1670: "Contract fixing damages void, every contract by which the
amount of damages to be paid, or the compensation to be made, for a breach of an obliga-
tion, is determined in anticipation thereof, is to that extent void, except as expressly
provided in the next Section;" CAL. Civ. CODE § 1671: "Exception. The parties to a contract
may agree therein upon an amount which shall be presumed to be the amount of damages
[Vol. 14
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Judicial Partition
The tenant owners are given co-ownership of common areas and
facilities within the project to avoid the necessity of entering into cumber-
some collateral easement and maintenance arrangements with each
individual owner. However, each co-owner has the right to compel parti-
tion of common parts through judicial process.34 This could cause either
a physical division of the property, each co-tenant receiving a several
interest in proportion to the amount of his undivided interest, or a sale
with direction to divide the proceeds.3 5
Although partition in kind is favored by the courts, a sale will still
be ordered where necessary to prevent great injustice or prejudice to
the owners."0 Because the common areas consist of such facilities as
stairwells, elevators and swimming pools, it would seem that it would
be a prejudice to the co-tenants not to order a sale. Such a sale would
leave the tenant owners without access to the common areas unless the
purchaser at the sale is willing to negotiate with each tenant owner for
some sort of easement agreement. Even if the purchaser is willing to
negotiate it is likely, considering the bargaining positions of the parties,
that the agreement reached may be both costly and unfair to the tenant
owners.
Absent statutory provision it is necessary that the Declaration of
Covenants and Restrictions contain a waiver of the tenant owner's right
to a judicial partition. The condominium declaration will usually pro-
vide that there shall be no partition by judicial sale until there is a
total or partial destruction of the building without a decision to repair
or rebuild. When the building is destroyed and there is no decision to
rebuild, then there is no longer a need to prohibit partition.
Waiver
It is established that the right to judicial partition may be waived
by agreement.3" The rule against restraining alienation is not violated
sustained by a breach thereof, when, from the nature of the case, it would be impracticable
or extremely difficult to fix the actual damage."
" CAL. CODE CirV. Paoc. § 752; De Roulet v. Mitchell, 70 Cal. App. 2d 120, 160 P.2d
574 (1945).
"CAL. CODE Cirv. Paoc. §§ 752, 763, 764.
"See Formosa Corp. v. Rogers, 108 Cal. App. 2d 397, 239 P.2d 88 (1951); Williams v.
Wells Fargo Bank, 56 Cal. App. 2d 645, 133 P.2d 73 (1943).
" Teutenberg v. Schiller, 138 Cal. App. 2d 18, 291 P.2d 53 (1955) ; Miranda v. Miranda,
81 Cal. App. 2d 61, 183 P.2d 61 (1947); Asels v. Asels, 43 Cal. App. 574, 185 Pac. 419
(1919) ; CAL. CIV. CODE § 3513.
by such a waiver." It would also seem that a waiver of the right to parti-
tion by judicial sale would not be subject to the Rule Against Perpetui-
ties for the grantor is not retaining a contingent future interest.
39
Therefore, there appears to be no need to limit the duration of the
waiver to lives in being plus 21 years. There is, however, a possibility
that a waiver of the right to judicial partition, if not limited to some ex-
tent, would be held to be unreasonable by our courts. It can be argued
that a waiver which is limited in duration to the life of the building
would be reasonable. Although such a waiver may be held to be unrea-
sonable in time, it would clearly seem to be reasonable in purpose. To
be absolutely safe, however, it would be wise to avoid the duration prob-
lem by limiting the effective period of the waiver clause to the destruc-
tion of the building or lives in being plus 21 years, whichever first occurs.
If such a time limitation is used by the drafter it would be advisable
for him to include in the Declaration provision for easements of ingress
and egress. Such easements would give the tenant owners access to the
common areas in the event of judicial sale after the period of the rule
has lapsed.
Conclusion
It seems apparent that the right of first refusal should be included
in the Declaration of Covenants and Restrictions to insure that the tenant
owners will be socially compatible and financially responsible persons.
The drafter should consider whether he wants the option to bind the
tenant owner's successors as well as the tenant owner himself. In this
regard the rule against restraint on alienation and the Rule Against
Perpetuities should be kept in mind so as to prevent the option from
being held void and of no effect.
The Declaration should also contain a clause by which the tenant
owner waives his right to judicial partition. The drafter should consider
the advisability of limiting the duration of the clause to the period of
the Rule Against Perpetuities. He should further consider including
easements of ingress and egress for the tenant owners in the event of
judicial sale after the period of the rule has elapsed.
A further solution to the problems presented by judicial partition
and rules against restraints on alienations and perpetuities would be
appropriate legislation dealing specifically with condominiums.
"6 The tenant owner maintains his right to convey the undivided interest subject to the
Declaration of Covenants and Restrictions. In turn the right to convey is subject to the
right of first refusal in the grantor.
" Prior to the repeal of CAL. CIv. CODE: § 715.1, it could have been argued that such a
waiver would restrain the absolute power of alienation.
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